The Trump Administration’s Policy Options in International Procurement by Yukins, Christopher R.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2017 
The Trump Administration’s Policy Options in International 
Procurement 
Christopher R. Yukins 
George Washington University Law School, cyukins@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Yukins, Christopher R., The Trump Administration’s Policy Options in International Procurement (2017). 
2016 West Gov. Contracts Year in Rev. Sess. 2-I (Feb. 2017); GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper 
No. 2017-8; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2017-8. Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=2925953 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
  Int'l-2-1 © 2017 Thomson Reuters
SESSION 2 - I
INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016—PART I: 
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S POLICY OPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
PROCUREMENT
Christopher R. Yukins 
The George Washington University Law School
Washington, D.C.
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2016 saw a radical break from the free-market norms that have, to an increasing extent, 
marked international procurement markets since World War II. In both the United Kingdom, with the 
Brexit referendum (discussed in an accompanying piece by Michael Bowsher QC), and in the United States 
with the election of Donald Trump, major electoral shifts meant that international trade in procurement 
may well face new barriers in the coming years. See, e.g., Sue Arrowsmith, The Implications of Brexit for 
Public Procurement Law and Policy in the United Kingdom, 2017 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 1; Christopher R. 
Yukins, Brexit and Procurement: A U.S. Perspective on the Way Ahead, 2017 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 71 (avail-
able on Westlaw). At the same time, protectionism on the European continent may be on the rise (see 
the accompanying piece by Dr. Pascal Friton, of Berlin), even as European states implements new EU 
procurement directives intended to facilitate cross-border trade (see the accompanying piece from Andrea 
Sundstrand, of Stockholm University).
The outlook for many international procurement markets is, in sum, grimmer than it has been in many 
years, although this adversity may bring new hope for alternative means -- such as regulatory coopera-
tion -- to reduce inefficient barriers to trade. See generally Christopher R. Yukins & Michael Bowsher QC, 
Brexit and the Trump Election: Finding a Way Forward for Transnational Procurement, 2016 Eur. Proc. 
& Pub. Priv. Part. L. Rev. 258 (available on Westlaw).
Part II of this piece will review the background to current developments in the United States. Part 
III will discuss the U.S. elections and the Trump administration’s approach to international procurement, 
Part IV will discuss some of the Trump administration’s policy options, and Part V will conclude by sum-
marizing, in a rough matrix of costs and benefits, those options. 
II. BACKGROUND: FREE TRADE AND PROCUREMENT
In modern economics, the working presumption for centuries (at least since Adam Smith published 
The Wealth of Nations in 1776) has been that open markets across borders achieve optimal domestic 
welfare. That presumption drove U.S. policy after World War II, and led to U.S. support for what is today 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a framework of international trade agreements that protect, 
among other things, free trade in procurement. See U.S. Department of State, Suggested Charter for an 
International Trade Organization of the United Nations Art. 9 (1946) (urging international trade arrange-
ments to reduce barriers to procurement markets); Sue Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO 
26-27 (2003); Christopher R. Yukins & Steven L. Schooner, Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments to 
a Global Public Procurement Market, 38 Geo. J. Int’l L. 529, 529 (2007); Robert D. Anderson & Sue Ar-
rowsmith, The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Past, Present and Future, in The WTO Regime 
on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform (Cambridge U. Press 2011); Sati Harutyunyan, Risk 
and Expectation in Exclusion from Public Procurement: Understanding Market Access and Harmonization 
Between the European Union and the United States, 45 Pub. Cont. L.J. 449 (2016).
In part as a result of those international agreements, which nurtured common legal norms as they 
opened procurement markets in the covered nations, procurement systems around the world generally 
Reprinted from West Government ContraCts Year In revIeW CoverInG 2016 ConferenCe BrIefs, with per-
mission of Thomson Reuters. Copyright © 2017. Further use without the permission of West is prohibited. 
For further information about this publication, please visit west.thomson.com/store, or call 800.328.9352.
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evolved along parallel tracks, adopting similar solutions to common problems. 
While the United States, Canada and the European Union were leaders in 
this evolution (see the accompanying piece from Brenda Swick, on Canada’s 
recent progress), developing nations joined the fold as they agreed to enter 
plurilateral free trade agreements (such as the WTO’s Government Procure-
ment Agreement (GPA)) and bilateral and regional free trade agreements 
(which typically include chapters on procurement).
These parallel developments touched both procurement law and trade. As 
channels of trade and communication opened, procurement regimes around the 
world assimilated common best practices (such as methods of procurement) and 
broadly accepted international norms (such as economic integration, sustainabil-
ity, and anti-corruption). See, e.g., Sue Arrowsmith, The Implications of Brexit for 
Public Procurement Law and Policy in the United Kingdom, 2017 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 
1, 2; Ijeoma Omambala & Nadia Motraghi, The Implications of Brexit for TUPE 
in the Area of Public Procurement, 2017 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 62; Eleanor Fisher, 
The Power of Purchase: Addressing Sustainability Through Public Procurement, 
8 Eur. Pub. Proc. Pub. Priv. L. Rev. 2 (2013). The trade agreements thus facili-
tated international competition in procurement and advanced other goals, such 
as respect for the rule of law. Disrupting the trade arrangements that underlie 
these achievements could therefore have broader political, security, social and 
legal effects, which could reach far beyond the procurement markets themselves.
III. PRESIDENT TRUMP AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
During and after the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump made 
it plain that while he considered himself a “free trader,” his administration 
plans to renegotiate existing trade arrangements in order to further core 
“Buy American” and “Hire American” policies. Candidate Trump criticized, 
for example, “China’s disastrous entry into the World Trade Organization,” 
and called for higher tariffs to protect U.S. industry. See Donald Trump, De-
claring American Economic Independence, https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/
DJT_DeclaringAmericanEconomicIndependence.pdf.
Donald Trump also called for higher U.S. defense spending, including 
increased spending on nuclear defense. At the same time, however, Trump 
argued for reducing the costs of specific programs, including the Joint Strike 
Fighter and Air Force One. E.g., Rowan Scarborough, Wash. Times, Jan. 4, 
2017, Donald Trump Blasts Boeing, Lockheed Martin for Overpriced Weapons, 
2017 WLNR 225822
After the election, President-elect Trump made his views on trade 
even clearer. As part of a post-election victory rally in Florida, for exam-
ple, President-elect Trump tweeted: “My Administration will follow two 
simple rules: BUY AMERICAN and HIRE AMERICAN.” https://twitter.
com/realDonaldTrump/status/809969373754654721. At another rally, in 
Iowa, Trump declared: “The American worker built this country and now 
it’s time for American workers to have a government [that] for the first 
time in decades answers to them.” See Daniella Diaz, Trump on Economy: 
“Buy American, Hire American,” Cable News Network (CNN) (Dec. 8, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/08/politics/donald-trump-terry-branstad-
china-des-moines-iowa-rally/. 
In the new Administration, the new National Trade Council will be tasked 
with implementing the Trump administration’s aggressive trade policies, in-
cluding through procurement. See The Trump-Pence Transition Team, Press 
© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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Release, President-Elect Donald J. Trump Appoints Dr. Peter Navarro to Head 
the White House National Trade Council (Dec. 21,.2016) (“The mission of the 
National Trade Council will be to advise the President on innovative strategies 
in trade negotiations, coordinate with other agencies to assess U.S. manufactur-
ing capabilities and the defense industrial base, and help match unemployed 
American workers with new opportunities in the skilled manufacturing sec-
tor. The National Trade Council will also lead the Buy America, Hire America 
program to ensure the President-elect’s promise is fulfilled in government 
procurement and projects ranging from infrastructure to national defense.”)
IV. OPTIONS FOR TRUMP TRADE POLICY IN PROCUREMENT
The Trump administration will have several options to consider, 
which carry different potential costs and benefits. Most of these options, 
it should be noted, could be exercised without new legislation. The list of 
options set forth here is not exhaustive, and it is possible that the Trump 
administration will consider, and follow, other protective strategies in 
procurement trade.
• Pressure Officials to “Buy American: Because imposing new
domestic preferences could run afoul of existing trade obligations (discussed 
below), the simplest option might be for the Trump administration to admon-
ish federal purchasers to “Buy American.” Given the flexibility inherent in 
the competitive negotiations used for most significant federal procurement, it 
would be relatively easy to mask a general domestic preference that was not 
included in formal evaluation criteria. If it became clear that procurement 
officials were regularly weighing an unstated preference in their evaluations, 
however, foreign vendors might protest successfully that procurement officials 
were unlawfully applying an ad hoc (and discriminatory) socioeconomic crite-
rion, without explicit statutory or regulatory authority. See, e.g., John Cibinic, 
Jr., Ralph C. Nash, Jr. & Christopher R. Yukins, Formation of Government 
Contracts 1572 (4th ed. 2011) (“There is a view that collateral policies can be 
implemented only when authorized by statute. GAO has ruled that an ex-
ecutive agency needs a clear grant of authority from Congress to implement 
a collateral policy that limits those who are eligible for award of contracts.” 
(citing authorities)). At the same time, a message to federal buyers that they 
should allow “Buy USA” preferences to override published evaluation criteria 
would undermine the rule of law in procurement, and could sour future U.S. 
efforts to open foreign procurement markets, as foreign governments (and 
purchasers) would be slow to forget perceived federal discrimination against 
foreign vendors.
• Ignore Free Trade Obligations Under Reciprocal Defense
Procurement Agreements: Another strategy, related to the first, would 
be to admonish Pentagon buyers to “Buy American” despite the United 
States’ commitment under reciprocal defense procurement agreements not 
to discriminate when buying defense materiel from the U.S. allies that have 
entered into these special agreements. (In 2016, Japan, Estonia and Slovenia 
joined the list of allies that have signed these memoranda of understand-
ing between the U.S. Defense Department and its counterpart ministries 
of defense. See, e.g., http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/reciprocal_procure-
ment_memoranda_of_understanding.html.)
A strategy of dismantling the reciprocal defense procurement agree-
ments could raise a thicket of legal, political and national security issues, 
however. While these reciprocal agreements (unlike the GPA and other free 
NOTES
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trade agreements) do not explicitly afford foreign vendors rights to protest, 
and instead anticipate that nations will simply leave the agreements if 
they suffer discrimination, see, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 8304; Drew B. Miller, Is 
It Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?, 39 Pub. 
Cont. L.J. 93 (2009), affected foreign vendors from U.S. allies that suffered 
discrimination might try to protest under the implementing rules set forth 
in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, DFARS Sub-
part 225.4. Undercutting the reciprocal defense procurement agreements 
also could hurt U.S. firms by shutting off foreign defense markets, which 
generally are not opened by traditional trade agreements and which are 
important for U.S. exporters. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce, Int’l 
Trade Admin., Defense Markets Report, at 9 (June 2016), http://trade.gov/
topmarkets/pdf/Defense_Top_Markets_Report.pdf). Moreover, reciprocal 
defense procurement agreements are explicitly meant to nurture other 
foreign policy and national security goals, such as interoperability and 
mutual cooperation. Triggering a “trade war” in defense procurement thus 
could prove deeply counterproductive, both economically and for purposes 
of national security. Moreover, if the Trump administration hopes to make 
U.S. defense spending more efficient while at the same time strengthening 
U.S. national security, competition from allies’ vendors may prove essen-
tial. Thus, a strategy of abandoning the reciprocal defense agreements 
(explicitly or implicitly), although relatively easy to implement, could raise 
serious costs and risks.
• Including “Buy American” Preferences with New Infrastruc-
ture Spending: A more likely course would be to include “Buy American” 
requirements in legislation authorizing new infrastructure spending -- which 
was another important element of the Trump campaign. Infrastructure 
funding legislation regularly includes “Buy American” requirements for pro-
curement done by grantees and federal agencies using the new funds; the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the “Recovery Act”), Pub. L. No. 
5, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Stat. 115 (2009), was a leading example of this 
type of requirements. 
The Recovery Act was also a good example of how a domestic preference 
embedded in infrastructure spending could be reconciled with standing inter-
national trade agreements. While Section 1605 of the Recovery Act called for 
the use of U.S. iron, steel and manufactured goods on projects funded by the 
Act, Section 1605 also explicitly stated that this preference would be applied 
“in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international 
agreements.” See, e.g., Thomas D. Blanford, Note, Navigating the Recovery 
Act’s Buy American Rule in State and Local Government Construction, 46 
Proc. Law. 3 (Fall 2010).
An explicit reservation regarding international trade obligations is 
important because, per the Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2511, the 
protections of international trade agreements are triggered only by explicit 
direction of the President or his delegee, and that authority has been exer-
cised only with regard to the Buy American Act and the U.S. Department 
of Defense Balance of Payments Program. See Exec. Order 12260 (1979) 
(authority delegated by President to U.S. Trade Representative); U.S. Trade 
Representative, Government Procurement, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/
government-procurement; FAR 25.402(a)(1) (“The President has delegated 
this waiver authority to the U.S. Trade Representative. In acquisitions 
covered by the WTO GPA, Free Trade Agreements, or the Israeli Trade 
© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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Act, the U.S. Trade Representative has waived the Buy American statute 
and other discriminatory provisions for eligible products. Offers of eligible 
products receive equal consideration with domestic offers.”); Jean Heilman 
Grier, Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Broad Authority, Narrow Application 
(Apr. 21, 2014), http://trade.djaghe.com/?p=559. 
Thus, unless legislation funding new infrastructure spending explicitly 
reserves the United States’ obligations under international trade agreements, 
an infrastructure bill that contains a “Buy American” limitation may trig-
ger a broader trade battle. If an infrastructure bill launched by the Trump 
administration is silent with regard to international obligations, and the 
United States therefore does not follow its trade agreements in the resulting 
spending, U.S. trading partners (such as the European Union) may argue that 
the United States’ obligations to open its procurement markets were already 
defined by agreement, and the U.S. statutory structure does not excuse those 
obligations. 
Moreover, not reserving those standing obligations in a new “Buy 
American” provision would mean losing the leverage that the exclusion 
could bring, with nations outside the scope of existing trade agreements. 
Canada, for example, opened its provincial markets for the first time 
specifically because of Section 1605 of the Recovery Act, as Canada was 
willing to open its provincial procurement markets in order to access Re-
covery Act spending. See Christopher R. Yukins, Barriers to International 
Trade in Procurement After the Economic Crisis -- Part II, Opening Inter-
national Procurement Markets: Unfinished Business, 2011 Gov’t Contracts 
Year in Review Briefs 4. Section 1605’s exclusion for existing agreements, 
in other words, both preserved the United States’ relationships with its 
trading partners and created new pressure on a nation that had not yet 
fully embraced open procurement markets. This history suggests that a 
Buy American preference in an infrastructure bill, combined with an ex-
clusion for existing U.S. obligations, could offer benefits at relatively low 
risk, though the higher costs and delays caused by the preference would 
be a continuing concern.
• Expanding Buy American Act Price Preference: Another 
strategy would be to expand the Buy American Act’s price preference. The 
language of the Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. § 8302, does not stipulate 
a price preference; instead, it states that, subject to certain exceptions, 
only “unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies that have been 
mined or produced in the United States, and only manufactured articles, 
materials, and supplies that have been manufactured in the United States 
substantially all from articles, materials, or supplies mined, produced, or 
manufactured in the United States, shall be acquired for public use un-
less the head of the department or independent establishment concerned 
determines their acquisition to be inconsistent with the public interest 
or their cost to be unreasonable.” (Emphasis added.) As implemented, 
the Buy American Act preference therefore turns on the relative unrea-
sonableness of a higher domestic price; if an offered domestic product is 
unreasonably expensive, the agency is to buy the cheaper foreign product. 
A general price preference (6 percent) was set by President Eisenhower 
under Executive Order 10582, Prescribing Uniform Procedures for Certain 
Determinations Under the Buy-American Act, 19 Fed. Reg. 8723 (1954), 
and current regulations set a higher price preference (12 percent) when 
the next-lowest-priced item is offered by a small business, FAR 25.105(b)
NOTES
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(2). In the Defense Department, DFARS 225.105 imposes a preference of 
50 percent on purchases of defense items. (That much higher preference at 
the Defense Department is tempered by the reciprocal defense procurement 
agreements, discussed above, which sweep away Buy American barriers 
against foreign defense materiel from qualifying countries. See DFARS 
252.225-7000 (Defense Department purchasers will “evaluate offers of 
qualifying country end products without regard to the restrictions of the 
Buy American statute”)).
Given the breadth of the Buy American Act’s language, the Trump 
administration might, for example, seek to increase the price preferences 
imposed under the Buy American Act regulations. Notably, the FAR al-
ready affords agencies the authority to set, by regulation, higher price 
preferences under the Act. FAR 25.105(a); see Kate M. Manuel, The Buy 
American Act -- Preferences for “Domestic” Supplies: In Brief, Cong. Res. 
Serv. Rep. R43140, at 2 & n.13 (Apr. 26, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R43140.pdf. 
While increasing the Buy American Act’s price preference might 
gain political points, its economic benefits would be relatively unfocused 
across the market, and it would raise costs in the procurement system, 
see, e.g., Keith A. Hirschman, The Costs and Benefits of Maintaining the 
Buy American Act 57-61 (Naval Postgraduate School 1998) (reviewing 
literature on costs of Act’s price preference), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/
fulltext/u2/a350159.pdf -- something that candidate Trump said he did 
not want to do. Moreover, a more expansive interpretation of the Buy 
American Act generally would still apply only to smaller procurements, 
up to the thresholds (typically $191,000 for supplies, and $7.3 million for 
construction) above which trade agreements in effect override the Buy 
American Act. See FAR 25.402(b) (thresholds); FAR 25.001(b) (“The re-
strictions in the Buy American statute are not applicable in acquisitions 
subject to certain trade agreements.”). In practice, therefore, increasing 
the price preference under the Buy American Act probably would create 
more market opportunities for the small U.S. businesses. that tend to focus 
on smaller, below-threshold procurements.
• Renegotiating Coverage Under Trade Agreements: It is un-
likely that the Trump administration would decide to withdraw entirely 
from the Government Procurement Agreement under Article XX of the 
agreement, since leaving the GPA could close off valuable market access 
abroad for U.S. exporters. Another option would be to try to reduce the scope 
of the U.S. procurement market available under the GPA. Were the Trump 
administration to reduce coverage, however, it would likely trigger protracted 
negotiations under Article IX of the GPA, and, if those negotiations proved 
unsuccessful, a challenge and potentially reciprocal reductions of access by 
other nations could follow -- a slowly unfolding “trade war” in procurement, 
in other words.
• Stalling Accessions to the GPA and Other Free Trade Agree-
ments: A final option would be to slow the accession of China and other low-
cost producers to the GPA, because by joining the GPA those countries would 
gain broad access to the U.S. procurement market. While delaying Chinese 
accession would not, in itself, reap significant political benefits for the Trump 
administration, since China’s accession process has already been pending 
for nearly a decade, see, e.g., Jean Heilman Grier, What are the prospects for 
© 2017 Thomson Reuters
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concluding work on China’s GPA accession in 2015?, 2015 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 
221, the flip -- allowing China to join -- could be seen as a serious reversal 
for the Trump administration. 
Some of the options discussed above raise risks of challenge under current 
trade agreements, either through a bid protest brought by a foreign vendor 
or through a government-to-government dispute brought under the GPA. 
Although the GPA explicitly provides for bid protests by vendors to enforce 
the agreement’s requirements, potential vendor bid protests on those grounds 
in the U.S. system were affected by a recent series of decisions before the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), Per Aarsleff a/s et al., Comp. Gen. 
B-410782 (Feb. 18, 2015), and then the Court of Federal Claims, Per Aarsleff 
A/S v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 603, 621 (2015), rev’d, 829 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016), and on appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. See, e.g., Ralph Nash, Jr., Preproposal Protests: When Are They Man-
datory?, 30 Nash & Cibinic Rep. NL ¶ 43 (2016); Fed. Cir. Reverses COFC On 
Eligibility Protest, 58 No. 27 GC ¶ 255 (2016).
The foreign vendors in the Per Aarsleff cases challenged the U.S. govern-
ment’s failure to honor an international agreement which assured Denmark 
that only Danish or Greenlandic firms would be awarded support contracts 
at Thule Air Base, in Greenland. The GAO decision explicitly bypassed 
the issues presented by the international agreement, focusing instead on 
the terms of the solicitation, id. at 7 & n.8, and the Justice Department, in 
defending the subsequent protest before the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, 
121 Fed. Cl. at 621, and on the appeal before the Federal Circuit, see Brief 
for Defendant-Appellant United States, Per Aarsleff v. United States, Fed. 
Cir. No. 2015-5111, at 47 (Sept. 29, 2015), argued that because the Court of 
Federal Claims is barred by 28 U.S.C. §1502 from hearing “claims” based on 
“treaties,” the Court of Federal Claims is similarly barred from hearing bid 
protests based upon international executive agreements. (The GPA and other 
free trade agreements are considered executive agreements. See, e.g., Jane M. 
Smith et al., Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-
Executive Agreements, Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. 97-896 (Apr. 15, 2013), https://fas.
org/sgp/crs/misc/97-896.pdf. The Court of Federal Claims did not disagree with 
the government’s argument that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
to hear a bid protest grounded in an international agreement, 121 Fed. Cl. 
at 622, though the court ultimately ruled on other grounds, and the Federal 
Circuit did not address the issue.
As a result of the Per Aarsleff decisions, foreign vendors may conclude 
that enforcing an international trade agreement -- fighting discrimination 
in procurement -- through the standard U.S. bid protest process is simply 
too difficult. If that happens, questions raised by the Trump administration’s 
trade initiatives in procurement would need to be resolved under the GPA’s 
government-to-government disputes process -- a much more cumbersome 
process, and one that may further aggravate relations with the United States’ 
allies and trading partners.
V. CONCLUSION: ASSESSING RISKS AND BENEFITS
Taking the various benefits and risks discussed above into account, it ap-
pears that the Trump administration faces an array of options, with differing 
risks and perceived benefits:
NOTES
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As the chart reflects, the lowest risk and largest potential benefits probably 
lie with including a “Buy American” provision in an infrastructure funding 
bill. Other options, such as attempting to slow the accessions of some countries 
(such as China) to the GPA, raise larger costs and risks, and some options, 
such as dismantling the reciprocal defense procurement agreements, present 
serious collateral risks to foreign policy and national security. 
This assessment is not intended to endorse any one option, or indeed any 
policy of aggressive protectionism. What the assessment is intended to do, 
however, is to show that some options -- such as a “Buy American” provision 
included in infrastructure funding legislation like the Recovery Act, with a 
reservation for standing agreements -- may be easier to pursue, and may carry 
less risk and cause less collateral damage to the other policy objectives that 
drive open borders in procurement.
